Texas Supreme Court Offers Exemplary Damage Guidance

Bennett v. Reynolds, No. 08-0074, 2010 WL 2541096 (Tex. June 25, 2010).

By Natalie Barletta and Andrew Wooley

In Bennett v. Reynolds the Supreme Court of Texas clarifies that the maximum ratio for exemplary to actual damages in Texas will rarely exceed 4 to 1 and that a defendant’s conduct generally, not just that specifically related to a tort, may be considered in gauging reprehensibility for federal due process purposes.

Reynolds sued Bennett and the Bonham Corporation, of which Bennett served as president, for conversion, alleging that they sold thirteen head of Reynolds’s cattle that strayed onto corporate land. The trial court awarded $5,327.11 in actual damages for the cattle’s market value and exemplary damages of $250,000 against Bennett and $1 million against the corporation. On appeal, Bennett and the corporation argued that the exemplary-to-compensatory ratios of 47:1 as to Bennett and 188:1 as to the Corporation “offend the ‘substantive’ limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Texas agreed, and remanded the case to the court of appeals for remittitur consistent with its opinion.
 

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Fifth Circuit Dismisses Appeal in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, et al

By Michael A. Mahone, Jr.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently dismissed the appeal in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA et al. because of the lack of a quorum. The appeal had been taken from the Southern District of Mississippi and a panel of the Fifth Circuit ruled on the merits. The case was then "voted en banc by a duly constituted quorum of the court consisting of nine members in regular active service who [were] not disqualified." However, "[a]fter the en banc court was properly constituted, new circumstances arose that caused the disqualification and recusal of one of the nine judges, leaving only eight judges in regular active service, on a court of sixteen judges, who [were] not disqualified." This, therefore, prevented the court from having a quorum.

Faced with this unique situation, the Fifth Circuit recognized that it could not conduct judicial business with respect to the appeal and could not reinstate the panel's decision, as it had been vacated. So, the court instead chose to order the clerk to dismiss the appeal without ever having reached the merits. Judges Davis and Dennis both authored dissenting opinions. Judge Davis argued that Chief Judge E. Grady Jolly should have, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291, appointed a judge from another circuit so as to constitute a quorum. Judge Dennis first argued that the court, in fact, had a quorum as the en banc panel included a majority of all of the judges who were not disqualified (rather than a majority of all of the judges). He also provided several additional arguments against the action taken by the majority: (1) because the panel's decision was vacated, the en banc panel had a duty to decide the case; (2) the Rule of Necessity would require the disqualified judges to participate in the decision because the appellants' constitutional right to an appeal would otherwise be infringed; (3) as Judge Davis argued, the court could have invited a judge from another circuit to participate in the decision; and (4) the court could have held the case in abeyance until an additional judge was appointed to the Fifth Circuit, assuming, of course, that this judge was not also disqualified.
 

For more information see http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/07/07-60756-CV2.wpd.pdf.