Update to the December 20, 2011 Liskow & Lewis E-Newsletter

By Megan Spencer

In our December 20, 2011 E-Newsletter, we reported on the status of: (1) EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule; and (2) the EPA Inspector General’s report, “EPA Must Improve Oversight of State Enforcement.” Some recent developments in those areas merit an update: 

(1) On December 30, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stayed EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR). The Court stayed CSAPR until it could resolve the petitions for review. In the meantime, EPA will continue to administer the Clean Air Interstate Rule. Click here for the complete ruling (PDF).

(2) Peggy Hatch, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), sent a response letter to the Inspector General of the EPA responding to the publication of EPA’s report, entitled “EPA Must Improve Oversight of State Enforcement.” The purpose of the response letter was to highlight some of the errors and omissions in the report criticizing Louisiana’s enforcement record. In her response, Secretary Hatch identified 14,454 enforcement actions that EPA did not take into account in evaluating the LDEQ’s enforcement record, and stated that Louisiana has seen tremendous improvement in ambient air and water quality in the recent past. Click here for the complete ruling (PDF).

 

EPA Proposes Modifications to Oil & Gas Air Pollution Standards

By Carlos J. Moreno:

On August 23, 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published in the Federal Register a proposed rule that significantly expands the applicable air emissions standards for the Oil and Natural Gas Sector. See 76 Fed. Reg. 52738 (Aug. 23, 2011), available at http://epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/actions.html. Specifically, EPA is proposing changes to the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) in 40 CFR part 60 and technology-based National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) in 40 CFR part 63 that apply to oil and gas production, processing, transmission and storage facilities.  According to EPA, the rules would result in a net savings for industry of $29 million because of the increased natural gas and condensate available for sale. The public comments period for the proposal ends on October 24, 2011.

New Source Performance Standards

Currently, two New Source Performance Standards apply to the oil and gas industrial category. Subpart KKK covers Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) emissions from leaking components in onshore natural gas processing plants, while Subpart LLL covers SO2 emissions from onshore natural gas processing plants. EPA conducted reviews of both standards as required by the Clean Air Act, and is now proposing changes to each. Specifically, EPA is proposing to update the Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) requirements in Subpart KKK, and modify Subpart LLL to require greater SO2 control in facilities that process natural gas with high sulfur content.  

In addition, the proposal would create a new NSPS Subpart OOOO to regulate VOC emissions from all oil and gas operations not already covered under Subpart KKK that commence construction, reconstruction, or modification after August 23, 2011.  The new Subpart OOOO would include operational standards for completions of hydraulically-fractured gas wells. Non-exploratory and non-delineation wells would need to use reduced emission completion, commonly referred to as “green completion,” while exploratory and delineation wells would be allowed to use pit flaring. For purposes of the rule, a completion associated with refracturing performed at a well existing prior to August 23, 2011 is considered a modification, subjecting the well to the new standards. The rule also requires a 30-day advance notification for each completion or recompletion of a hydraulically fractured gas well. EPA is also proposing VOC emissions limits for gas-driven pneumatic devices, equipment standards for centrifugal compressors, operational standards for reciprocating compressors, and a 95% VOC emission reduction requirement for some condensate and crude oil storage tanks. Finally, the proposal exempts some “non-major” sources that would be subject to Subpart OOOO from having to obtain Title V permits.

NESHAP Technology-Based Standards

Under 40 CFR part 63, there are two technology-based NESHAP standards that apply to sources in the Oil and Gas sector.  Subpart HH covers oil and natural gas production facilities that are major or area sources of Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAP). The rule includes standards for the following emission points: glycol dehydrator vents, storage vessels, and natural gas processing plant equipment leaks. On the other hand, Subpart HHH covers natural gas transmission and storage facilities that are major sources of HAP, and only includes standards for emissions from glycol dehydrator process vents. These NESHAP standards require major sources to use Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT). As required by the Clean Air Act, EPA conducted technology reviews and residual risk assessment reviews for both standards. Based on the findings from the reviews, EPA is proposing changes to both MACT standards for major sources. 

The proposal establishes new emissions limits for small glycol dehydrators at major sources, which were previously exempted under Subpart HH and HHH. EPA is also proposing to eliminate the alternative compliance option under Subpart HH and HHH, which allows sources to reduce benzene emissions from large glycol dehydrators to less than 0.9 Mg/yr in lieu of achieving 95% emissions control. In addition, the rule proposes to eliminate the existing Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction (SSM) exemption that made emission standards inapplicable during periods of SSM.  However, EPA proposes to add an affirmative defense to civil penalties and exceedances of emission limits caused by malfunctions.  Finally, the proposal would modify Subpart HH to require all crude oil and condensate tanks at major sources to control their HAP emissions by at least 95%, and requires inclusion of all tank emissions when performing major source determinations.

EPA's Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Will Have A Dramatic Impact on Texas and Louisiana

By: Lesley Foxhall Pietras

On August 8, 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a far-reaching Clean Air Act rule intended to address the interstate transport of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from upwind to downwind states. See 76 Fed. Reg. 48208 (Aug. 8, 2011). Specifically, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) requires 27 states, including Louisiana and Texas, to make dramatic cuts in power plant emissions. Emissions reductions will take effect quickly, starting January 1, 2012 for SO2 and annual NOx reductions, and May 1, 2012 for ozone season (May-September) NOx reductions. Texas power plants must meet the January 1, 2012 deadline for SO2 and annual NOx emissions, and the May 1 deadline for ozone season NOx emissions. Louisiana power plants must meet the May 1 deadline to reduce ozone season NOx emissions.

As promulgated, CSAPR will have dramatic impacts on Texas and Louisiana. According to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, CSAPR requires Texas power plants to lower SO2 emissions by 46 percent and NOx emissions by 7 percent compared with 2009 levels. See Kate Galbraith and Ari Auber, Controversial Pollution Rule Still on Track for Texas, The Tex. Tribune, Sept. 5, 2011. As for Louisiana, the Louisiana Public Service Commission’s consultant notes that CSAPR requires Louisiana power plants to reduce NOx emissions by 42 percent compared to 2010 levels. See David E. Dismukes, Acadian Consulting Group, Commissioner Briefing & Proposed Staff Recommendation: EPA’s Recently-Proposed Cross State Air Pollution Rule, Louisiana Public Service Commission Business & Executive Meeting (Sept. 7, 2011). Making these cuts by the highly compressed deadline could jeopardize the ability of the Texas and Louisiana electric grids to supply sufficient power to businesses and consumers. The reductions could even lead to rolling blackouts. For example, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the independent power system operator for the state, estimates that implementing CSAPR could result in a power generation capacity reduction of as much as 1,400 MW during the summer peak months. A reduction of that magnitude would have resulted in rotating outages during some days in August 2011. See ERCOT, Impacts of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule on the ERCOT System at 5 (Sept. 1, 2011). Additionally, Luminant, the largest power generator in Texas, recently announced that it will need to close certain facilities to comply with CSAPR, which will cause the loss of approximately 500 jobs. See Luminant News Release, Luminant Announces Facility Closures, Job Reductions in Response to EPA Rule (Sept. 12, 2011). Moreover, in light of the substantial capital that power plants will need to spend on pollution control technology to comply with CSAPR, the rule will significantly increase the cost of electricity for all consumers, including businesses and individuals.

Numerous parties are considering challenges to CSAPR. Under the Clean Air Act, the deadline to file petitions for review of the rule is October 7, 2011. Petitions for reconsideration also must be filed by that same date.

EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Issue Draft Guidance on Waters Protected by Clean Water Act

By Lesley Foxhall Pietras

On April 27, 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) released new proposed guidance on how the agencies will identify waters protected by the Clean Water Act (CWA) in light of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC) and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Although EPA and the Corps have previously issued guidance interpreting SWANCC and Rapanos (EPA’s earlier guidance on Rapanos is discussed at www.theenergylawblog.com/2007/07/articles/environmental/epa-and-army-corps-of-engineers-publish-joint-guidance/ ), the agencies believe “previous guidance did not make full use of the authority provided by the CWA to include waters within the scope of the Act, as interpreted by the Court.” Guidance at 2. The agencies therefore expect that, under the new proposed guidance, “the number of waters identified by the [CWA] will increase compared to current practice.” 76 Fed. Reg. 24479, 24479 (May 2, 2011). Accordingly, the proposed guidance appears to substantially expand the agencies’ jurisdiction when compared to the prior guidance. Public comment on the proposed guidance must be received on or before July 1, 2011. Id.

In SWANCC, the Supreme Court addressed the question of CWA jurisdiction over isolated, non-navigable, intrastate ponds, and concluded that CWA jurisdiction could not be based solely on the presence of migratory birds. In Rapanos, the Court addressed CWA protections for wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, but issued five opinions with no single opinion commanding a majority. The proposed guidance emphasizes that the plurality opinion concluded that “waters of the United States” extends beyond traditional navigable waters to include “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731-32; see also id. at 739. The proposed guidance also highlights the plurality opinion’s conclusion that only wetlands with a “continuous surface connection” to other jurisdictional waters are considered “adjacent” and protected by the CWA. Id. at 742. In contrast, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, the proposed guidance notes, concluded that “waters of the United States” includes wetlands with a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780. The agencies continue to believe that they can assert jurisdiction over waters that satisfy either the plurality standard or Justice Kennedy’s standard, because a majority of justices would support jurisdiction under either standard. Guidance at 2.

Under the proposed guidance, the following waters are protected by the CWA: traditional navigable waters (including water bodies that have been found to be navigable-in-fact by a federal court, and waters which are currently used, historically have been used, or are susceptible to being used for commercial navigation); interstate waters (even if such waters are not traditional navigable waters); and wetlands adjacent to either traditional navigable waters or non-wetland interstate waters.

Moreover, the proposed guidance determines which waters are covered by the CWA pursuant to the standard set out in the Rapanos plurality opinion. In this vein, non-navigable tributaries are subject to CWA jurisdiction, if the tributary is connected to a downstream traditional navigable water, and flow in the tributary is at least seasonal. Guidance at 13. Wetlands that directly abut relatively permanent waters are also covered by the CWA. Id. at 15.

Additionally, the following types of waters are covered by the CWA if a fact-specific analysis determines they have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters:
• tributaries to traditional navigable waters or to interstate waters;
• wetlands adjacent to jurisdictional tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters; and
• waters that fall under the “other waters” category of the regulations, including intrastate lakes, rivers, and mudflats. The proposed guidance divides these waters into two categories (those that are physically proximate to other jurisdictional waters and those that are not) and discusses how each category should be evaluated.
According to the proposed guidance, waters have the requisite “significant nexus” “if they, either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of traditional navigable waters or interstate waters.” Guidance at 7.

Under the proposed guidance, waters that are not covered by the CWA include artificially irrigated areas which would revert to upland if the irrigation ceased; artificial lakes or ponds which are used for stock watering, irrigation, settling basins, or rice growing; artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools excavated in uplands; water-filled depressions created in dry land incidental to construction activity and pits excavated in dry land for the purpose of obtaining fill; groundwater drained through subsurface drainage systems; and erosional features, swales and ditches that are not tributaries or wetlands. Guidance at 21.

The proposed guidance will apply to all CWA programs, including section 303 water quality standards, section 311 oil spill prevention and response, section 401 water quality certification, section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits, and section 404 permits for discharges of dredged or fill material.

After the agencies receive comment on the proposed guidance, they plan to finalize the guidance and then propose revisions to the existing regulations to further clarify which waters are covered by the CWA.

For more information on the proposed guidance, see water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters.cfm

Latest Chapter in the "EPA v. Texas" GHG Permitting Saga: EPA Publishes Final Rule Partially Disapproving Texas SIP and Promulgates FIP for GHG Emissions

by: Carlos J. Moreno

On May 3, 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated a final rule partially disapproving the Texas State Implementation Plan (SIP) and issuing a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for Texas. The action prolongs EPA's authority to issue Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits for Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) emissions in Texas. Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), states have authority to implement the federal National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) if the state submits, and EPA approves, a State Implementation plan (SIP). The SIP must include implementation of preconstruction PSD permitting requirements for NAAQS pollutants and, according to EPA, non-NAAQS pollutants. The CAA authorizes EPA to call for revisions to a SIP ("SIP Call") if the agency later finds that a SIP is inadequate. Following a series of EPA regulatory actions, GHG emissions became subject to PSD requirements as a non-NAAQS pollutant beginning on January 2, 2011. Since then, the EPA Tailoring Rule has required sources that trigger PSD for pollutants other than GHGs to also permit GHG emissions if they are 75,000 tpy or more.

On December 1, 2010, EPA issued a SIP Call for 13 states, including Texas, whose SIPs needed revisions in order to regulate GHG emissions under their PSD permitting program. Contrary to the other states, Texas refused to set a timeline for a SIP revision, effectively telling EPA that it would not revise its SIP to cover GHG emissions. To ensure that sources could obtain GHG permits, EPA issued an interim final rule and a "mirror" rule proposal in December 2010 that partially disapproved the Texas SIP and promulgated a FIP authorizing EPA to issue GHG permits under PSD. EPA stated that it erred in approving the Texas SIP 18 years earlier because the SIP does not contain assurances of adequate legal authority for the application of PSD to newly regulated non-NAAQS pollutants. The interim final rule was set to expire on April 30, 2011. Texas has filed several judicial challenges to EPA's GHG regulations in the DC Circuit, as well as a challenge in the 5th Circuit to EPA's SIP Call finding the Texas SIP inadequate. After issuance of the final interim rule, Texas requested a stay of the rule in the DC Circuit. The DC circuit granted a 30-day stay that was subsequently lifted on January 12, 2011. Since then, EPA has effectively been the permitting authority for GHG emissions in Texas. On May 3, 2011, EPA finalized the December 2010 rule proposal partially disapproving the Texas State Implementation Plan (SIP) and issuing a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for Texas. The action was made effective on May 1st to ensure no gap in permitting coverage.

One of the arguments that Texas has pursued is that EPA issued the December 2010 error correction FIP without proper notice and comment. By essentially reissuing the FIP under this final rule after notice and comment, EPA has addressed this argument. Under the FIP, EPA continues to be the PSD permitting authority for GHG emissions in Texas, while Texas continues to be the permitting authority for non-GHG emissions. Therefore, a project that is currently subject to PSD may require two PSD permits: a Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) PSD permit for pollutants other than GHG, and a EPA PSD permit for GHG emissions if the project has 75,000 tpy or more of GHG emissions. Currently, GHG PSD permits are only required if New Source Review is triggered by a non-GHG pollutant. But, starting on July 1, 2011, EPA's GHG Tailoring Rule will also require PSD permits for sources that trigger PSD solely because of their GHG emissions (100,000 tpy or more of GHG's for new projects; 75,000 tpy or more of GHG's for modifications). For these projects, EPA will be the PSD permitting authority for all pollutants. The final error correction FIP will remain in place until Texas submits, and EPA approves, a SIP revision including GHG permitting. Under EPA's standing SIP Call, Texas still has until December 1, 2011 to submit a SIP revision that includes application of PSD program requirements to GHG emissions. EPA has already stated that if Texas does not submit a revision by this date, EPA is prepared to promulgate a new FIP associated with the SIP Call, which would replace the May 3rd FIP, but be "fully consistent" with it. In the meantime, litigation regarding EPA's authority to regulate GHGs, error correction FIP for Texas, and the GHG SIP Call is continuing in the DC Circuit and 5th Circuit.

Supreme Court of Texas Reverses Appeals Court in Oil and Gas Waste Injection Well Permitting Case

By: Carlos J. Moreno

In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water, No. 08-0497, 2011 WL 836827 (Tex. Mar. 11, 2011), the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Austin Court of Appeal’s finding that the Railroad Commission (the “Commission”) has to consider broad public safety concerns in the permitting of proposed oil and gas waste injection wells.

Continue Reading...

Extra! Extra! Read All About It!

Thanks to you, our readership, Liskow’s Energy Law Blog has been nominated for the LexisNexis Top 50 Environmental Law & Climate Change Blogs!  If you like what you see on our blog, please let the ELCCC (LexisNexis Environmental Law & Climate Change Community) know by commenting “here” (go ahead and do it now, nomination support ends February 14).  We appreciate your online interest in our industry blog and hope that you continue to follow it and invite a few colleagues to do the same!

EPA Denied Extension to Promulgate Boiler MACT Rule

By: Megan J. Spencer

EPA first issued its Boiler MACT Rule on September 13, 2004. However, these standards were vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after the Court found EPA’s definition of “commercial or industrial waste” conflicted with the language of the Clean Air Act in NRDC v. EPA, 489 F. 3d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The deadline for EPA to issue its Boiler MACT Rule was judicially imposed on EPA in Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2006), requiring EPA to fulfill its statutory duties of promulgating emissions standards by June 15, 2009. However, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted several unopposed motions to extend this deadline for the Boiler MACT Rule, resulting in an eventual deadline of January 21, 2011. EPA requested another extension of this deadline through April 13, 2012, but this request was opposed by the plaintiff, the Sierra Club.

EPA argued that it needed a fifteen-month, or alternatively a five-month, further extension of the January 21, 2011, deadline because: (1) in light of the comments received after the proposed rules, EPA must re-propose the rules to ensure that the final rules are a logical outgrowth of the proposed rules; and (2) in the alternative, EPA needs a five-month extension to fulfill its statutory duty of responding to all significant comments. However, the court agreed with the plaintiff that EPA had failed to satisfy the impossibility standard for the setting of emissions standards within the previous deadline set by the court. Thus, the court denied EPA’s request for an extension until April 13, 2012 so that EPA could re-propose the rules before issuing the final rules. The Court also denied the five-month extension requested by EPA to respond to all comments and instead gave EPA one-month to promulgate its Boiler MACT Rule finding that EPA had not provided sufficient evidence on why it needed five months to respond to comments it had already began reviewing.   

Although EPA argued to the District Court that it wanted an extension to re-propose the rules including another round of public comment, EPA submitted the final rules to the White House Office of Management and Budget for review on January 21, 2011, the same day the court denied the request for an extension. www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/01/21/21greenwire-with-extension-denied-epa-sends-boiler-rules-t-75622.html 

It is likely that EPA will use section 307(d)(7)(B) of the CAA for administrative reconsideration of the rules without postponing the effectiveness of the rules. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B). Additionally, because of the far reaching nature of the Boiler MACT Rule, it is also possible that the rules could face judicial challenges. 

                                                                                                                                  

Congress has also indicated that it may get involved in EPA’s deadline to promulgate its Boiler MACT Rule. At a January 26 hearing of the House Energy & Commerce Committee, Rep. Fred Upton (R-MI) offered to advance legislation that would provide EPA with more time to issue its final Boiler MACT Rule. 

See full opinion at: Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 01-1537, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5316 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2011). 

Fifth Circuit Reverses District Court Ruling Protecting Mineral Owner's Rights of Ingress and Egress Over National Park Service Land

by: Megan J. Spencer

 

            In its decision, filed January 7, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, vacated and remanded the opinion of a Texas district court that had found that the National Park Service’s Oil and Gas Management Plan was invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) because it denied Plaintiffs rights of ingress and egress established in the state and federal law creating the park.  Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 09-40187 (5th Cir. 2011).  The case involved land in the Padre Island National Park, created in 1963.  The conflict arose between the National Park Service (“Service”), owner of surface estates, and Plaintiffs who were owners of mineral estates.  The Service appealed the decision of the district court.     

            The Service made two arguments on appeal.  First, it advanced a plain language argument based on the text of the Texas law creating that park.  The Texas law made an exception for the use of the surface of the land for the reasonable development of oil, gas, and other minerals –  including the right of ingress and egress.  However, this right was only granted to the “grantors or successors in title” of surface land to the United States.  Plaintiffs argued that this language in the statute was ambiguous, and thus even though they were not grantors or successors in title, the right of ingress and egress applied to them.  The Service argued that the language of the statute was clear, and the right of ingress and egress was only granted to the mineral owners who conveyed surface land to the Service.  The Court agreed with the Service’s plain language interpretation, finding that the right of ingress and egress did not apply to the Plaintiffs here. 

            Second, the Service argued that a second exception in the law creating the park did not apply to the Plaintiffs because the Plaintiffs’ mineral estates were within the Seashore’s boundaries.  The act creating the park excluded from ingress and egress restrictions those minerals that were removed from outside the boundaries of the seashore.  Thus, Plaintiffs argued that because they privately owned the mineral estates, these mineral estates were technically not within the park boundaries.  The Fifth Circuit found that despite the private ownership of the mineral estates below the surface of the land, Plaintiffs’ mineral estates were within the park’s boundaries.     

            Although the case deals with laws specific to the Padre Island National Park and Seashore, it has broader implications for mineral estate owners who have mineral estates located partially or fully within national park boundaries.  The Fifth Circuit joined the position of three other circuit courts finding that “land that is not owned by the Service can still exist within the boundaries of a national park.” 

 

The full text of the opinion is available at the following link:   www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/09/09-40187-CV0.wpd.pdf

Fifth Circuit Reverses Summary Judgment in Oil Pollution Act Case

In Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America), Inc., 2010 WL 5421015 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 2010), the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of summary judgment on liability under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).  In doing so, the Court determined that at the summary judgment stage of a complex OPA case involving a number of different parties, it was improper for the court to rely solely on allegations made in the pleadings in order to find that one particular party was not liable under OPA. 

 

            The facts of the case are as follows:  In July 2008, an ocean-going tanker traveling on the Mississippi River collided with a barge which contained oil.  As a result, a large amount of oil spilled from the barge into the river near New Orleans.  Immediately after the spill, the owner of the barge denied liability; however, as the owner of the discharging vessel, it agreed to coordinate the removal and cleanup efforts with the Coast Guard.  A number of lawsuits followed involving the owner of the barge (“Barge Owner”), the owners of the tanker (“Tanker Owner”), DRD Towing, LLC (“DRD”), which was the company that supplied the crew for the tug that was towing the barge, as well as other parties.  These lawsuits were then consolidated into the first-filed action.  The Tanker Owner moved for summary judgment arguing that it was not liable under OPA.

 

            OPA provides generally that each “responsible party” for a vessel or facility from which oil is discharged is liable for the damages caused by such an incident.  Further, the responsible party for a vessel is any person owning or operating the vessel.  OPA, however, also provides a responsible party with a complete defense to liability in the following circumstance:

 

A responsible party is not liable…if the responsible party establishes, by preponderance of the evidence, that the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil and the resulting damage or removal costs were caused solely by an act or omission of a third party, other than…a third party whose act or omission occurs in connection with any contractual relationship with the responsible party…. 

 

33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3).  The Tanker Owner argued that because the Barge Owner’s pleadings admitted that the Barge Owner was in a contractual relationship with DRD, and because the pleadings also admitted that DRD had some fault in causing the collision, as a matter of law, the Barge Owner could not shift liability to the Tanker Owner under OPA.  Accordingly, summary judgment was proper in favor of the Tanker Owner.  The district court granted the Tanker Owner’s motion finding that at least some fault was attributable to the Barge Owner and/or DRD.

 

            On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that summary judgment was premature and, therefore, reversed the lower court’s ruling.  First, the Court found that the Barge Owner had taken inconsistent positions in its pleadings in the various district court actions.  Specifically, although the Barge Owner admitted in its pleadings that it had a contractual relationship with DRD, the Barge Owner had also filed a separate declaratory judgment action to have any contracts with DRD declared void ab initio.  Citing Fifth Circuit precedent, the Court reasoned that one of two inconsistent pleas cannot be used as evidence in the trial of another.  Accordingly, the district court erred in treating the allegations in any one of the Barge Owner’s pleadings as an admission sufficient to settle an issue of fact. 

 

            Given the complex nature of the case and the unresolved relationships between the parties, the Court also found that it was premature to treat any party’s mere allegations as sufficient evidence to conclude that a contractual partner of the Barge Owner had some fault in the collision such that summary judgment in favor of the Tanker Owner was warranted.  Further, there had not been sufficient factual development to conclusively assign fault to any of the parties.  Thus, the Court reversed the granting of summary judgment.

 

            The Gabarick opinion suggests that in certain OPA cases involving complex factual scenarios and numerous different parties, it may be improper for a court to rely solely on allegations made in the pleadings in order to grant summary judgment absolving a party of OPA liability. 

 

EPA Releases Guidance On Greenhouse Gas Permitting Leaving Many Questions Unanswered

by Megan Spencer

    On November 10, 2010, EPA released guidance for states and permitting authorities to begin including greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions in PSD and Title V permitting processes entitled PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance For Greenhouse Gases. (“Guidance”). This Guidance is scheduled to take effect January 2, 2011. EPA gave the public a short window to submit comments on the Guidance, with the comment period ending December 1, 2010. However, this Guidance left much to be interpreted by permitting authorities, leaving industries subject to the new Guidance wondering how it will be applied to them.
    The Guidance applies EPA’s “top down” analysis of best available control technology (“BACT”) to GHG emissions. BACT in Clean Air Act permitting actions for new and modified sources. This BACT analysis involves the following steps: 1) identify all available control technologies; 2) eliminate technically infeasible options; 3) rank remaining options by emissions control effectiveness; 4) evaluate economic, energy, and other environmental impacts; and, 5) select best option as BACT for the source. The Guidance provides a list of available control technologies under step 1 including inherently lower-emitting processes/practices/designs, add-on controls, and combinations of the two. Under step 2, a technology is “technically feasible” if it has been demonstrated in practice or is available and applicable to the source type under review. When ranking options under step 3, ranking should be based on total CO2e. Those available options are then evaluated under step 4. Under step 5, the goal of the BACT selection is to have the highest level of control that the applicant could not adequately justify its elimination based on the factors in step 4.
     The Guidance emphasizes energy efficiency as a means to achieve lower GHG emissions. (Guidance, p. 30). However, the Guidance does not provide definitive answers for how energy efficiency is to be determined. This uncertainty leaves those industries subject to the new guidance wondering whether energy efficiency will be applied to the entire facility, on an individual equipment basis, or across a production unit. With the discretion of how this energy efficiency goal will be interpreted left to the permitting authority, uniformity among states and permitting programs will be lacking. This uncertainty will likely lead to increased costs and delays in permit approvals.
One of the more controversial issues raised by the guidance is whether GHG BACT could force an applicant to redesign its source. Well-settled BACT procedures state that “EPA has recognized that a Step 1 list of options need not necessarily include inherently lower polluting processes that would fundamentally redefine the nature of the source proposed by the permit applicant. BACT should generally not be applied to regulate the applicant’s purpose or objective for the proposed facility.” However, the Guidance then continues with a statement that “permitting agencies must take a ‘hard look’ at the applicant’s proposed design in order to discern which design elements are inherent for the applicant’s purpose and which design elements may be changed to achieve pollutant emissions reductions without disrupting the applicant’s basic business purpose.” At best, this language is likely to lead to widely varying results between different permitting authorities.
     Another unanswered question involves the inclusion of carbon capture and sequestration in the Guidance. The Guidance suggests that carbon capture and sequestration is an available control technology that should be considered under step one of the BACT analysis. Notably, the Guidance recognizes in a footnote that carbon capture and sequestration is not yet ready for large-scale implementation. (Guidance, p. 33, fn. 82). This acknowledgment suggests that facilities should not be required to carry the use of carbon capture and sequestration past steps 1 or 2 when it is not “available” or “feasible” for large-scale implementation.
 

The full text of the Guidance is available at the following link:www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail

EPA Encourages Consideration of Ocean Acidification in Clean Water Act Impairment Listings

By Carlos J. Moreno:

On November 15, 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a memorandum providing States with guidance on how to address ocean acidification in their Clean Water Act 303(d) impairment listings. 

Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act requires States to list water bodies that will not meet Water Quality Standards, even after technology-based permit requirements are implemented. States must then identify every contributing source, including contributions from air emissions, and make plans to bring the impaired water body into compliance. This process results in the calculation of a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL). There is precedent for TMDLs addressing air emission sources, specifically in relation to atmospheric deposition of mercury. 

The EPA Memo is part of an EPA settlement with the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD), which sued EPA over 303(d) listing of coastal waters for ocean acidification. The CBD had argued that ocean acidification (the decrease in ocean pH caused by increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere) required EPA to modify its Recommended Marine pH Criteria and consider ocean acidification in 303(d) list approvals. The Memo encourages States to list coastal waters for ocean acidification, based on existing Marine pH Water Quality Standards, where there is enough data to support it. For example, Puerto Rico’s 2010 303(d) list already includes five coastal water segments impaired by marine pH. At the same time, the agency recognizes that many States do not yet have enough monitoring data to make such a listing. EPA pledges to issue TMDL-specific guidance related to ocean acidification once there is more information on air deposition of carbon in coastal waters.

The EPA memo only addresses ocean acidification from a 303(d) list perspective and does not modify EPA’s Recommended Marine pH Criteria. It is unclear how these developments may affect, if at all, future EPA Ocean Discharge Criteria evaluations under Section 403 of the Clean Water Act.

For more information on the Memorandum, see:

http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/oa_memo_nov2010.cfm 

EPA Releases Final Rule Requiring Oil and Gas Sources to Report Emissions of Greenhouse Gases

By Carlos J. Moreno

On November 8, 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released its final Subpart W rule to cover petroleum and natural gas facilities under the agency’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Reporting Program. The original Subpart W rule for petroleum and natural gas facilities was proposed in March 2010. The industry segments covered by the rule are: offshore petroleum and natural gas production; onshore petroleum and natural gas production; onshore natural gas processing; onshore natural gas transmission compression; underground natural gas storage; liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage, import, and export; and natural gas distribution. The rule requires facilities emitting 25,000 metric tons or more of CO2 equivalents per year to report GHG emissions to EPA annually. Under the final rule, facilities are required to begin collecting emissions data on January 1, 2011, and the first annual report is due by March 31, 2012. Data submitted to EPA must be self-certified by facility reporters and is subject to EPA verification.

The final rule excludes gathering lines and boosting stations from the onshore petroleum and natural gas production source category. The rule also gives onshore petroleum and natural gas production facilities the option to use Best Available Monitoring Methods (BAMM) for specific sources during part of the 2011 calendar year. EPA may consider individual petitions to extend the use of BAMM if there are extreme or unusual circumstances.

One of the more controversial requirements in the proposed rule, the “basin-level” definition of an onshore production facility, remains largely unchanged in the final rule. For onshore production sources, the rule defines “facility” as “all petroleum or natural gas equipment on a well pad or associated with a well pad and CO2 E[nhanced] O[il] R[ecovery] operations that are under common ownership or common control including leased, rented, or contracted activities by an onshore petroleum and natural gas production owner or operator and that are located in a single hydrocarbon basin.” By defining the term “facility” this way, individual production wells that are under the reporting threshold may be pulled in if the owner or operator has additional wells in the same basin. In that case, the emissions from the individual wells would be aggregated and treated as one “facility” for reporting purposes. Although this definition departs from how “facility” is defined in other regulatory programs, EPA asserts that the basin-level definition is necessary to ensure appropriate emissions coverage and meet the intent of the GHG Reporting Program. EPA did include language that explicitly limits the basin-level definition to the GHG Reporting Rule.

Offshore petroleum and natural gas production facilities must include emissions from equipment leaks, venting, and flaring. Emissions from portable equipment and drilling operations (unless drilling is conducted from a production platform) are excluded for this industry segment. Reporting for offshore facilities is still based on the BOEM Gulfwide Emissions Inventory process.

For more information on the final rule, see: www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/subpart/w.html

Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal Reverses District Court's Dismissal in Arsenic Land Damage Case

By Stephen Wiegand

In David v. Mosaic Global Operations, (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/27/10), the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of land contamination claims brought against the manufacturer of a tick-killing agent used on cattle. The plaintiffs were landowners who alleged that the product had contaminated their land and water with arsenic. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on various grounds. Notably, the trial court determined that because the utility of the cattle dip outweighed the danger-in-fact, the cattle dip was not “dangerous per se” under Louisiana products liability law. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring the action because they did not own the property when the original contamination occurred and because none of the plaintiffs acquired the right to pursue recovery for such damage from the previous landowners.

On appeal, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court. The appellate court found that genuine issues of fact existed with regard to whether the cattle dip was dangerous per se. For example, there were no instructions for safe disposal of the dip and no instructions on how to decontaminate land saturated by the product. Further, it was improper for the trial court to determine that because the cattle dip effectively eradicated ticks that the utility necessarily outweighed the danger-in-fact. The trial court failed to undertaken a full and proper analysis of the risk utility test for determining whether the product was dangerous per se.

Most notably, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had standing to assert their claims under Louisiana products liability law based on their allegations that they had been injured as a result of exposure to high levels of arsenic in the groundwater. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the defendant’s reliance on LeJeune Bros., Inc. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., LLC, (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/28/07), 981 So.2d 23, for the proposition that the plaintiffs lacked standing was misplaced. The court reasoned that the Lejeune holding was limited to a specific set of circumstance: the potential acquisition of a cause of action under a pre-existing mineral lease. Because the David plaintiffs’ claims, however, were not based on property law but instead on Louisiana products liability law, the Lejeune reasoning was not applicable. Accordingly, the fact that the plaintiffs did not own the property when the contamination occurred and that none of the plaintiffs acquired the right to pursue recovery from the previous landowners did not necessarily preclude their claims.

The full text of the opinion is available here: www.la3circuit.org/opinions/2010/10/1027/09-1237opi.pdf
 

Louisiana Supreme Court Issues Opinion in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

 

By Michael A. Mahone, Jr.

On October 19, 2010, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its opinion in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., a “legacy” lawsuit involving damage to property located in St. Mary Parish caused by historical oil and gas operations. The 4-3 ruling authored by Justice Victory clarified the law applicable to these lawsuits in a number of significant ways.

First, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs’ tort claims were prescribed. The courts below had held that, as a result of contra non valentem, prescription did not begin to run until plaintiffs received expert testing data showing contamination existed on their land and/or had full knowledge of the damage at issue. The Supreme Court, however, reaffirmed existing law and held that prescription begins to run when a plaintiff has sufficient information, which, if pursued, would have put him on notice that further inquiry and investigation was necessary, where such inquiry would have led to knowledge that contamination existed. Based on this standard, the Court found that plaintiffs’ knowledge of apparent damage triggered prescription without regard to when expert testing occurred. In addition, the majority rejected the argument that the plaintiffs were “lulled” into inaction by ExxonMobil’s representations. As for the applicability of the continuing tort doctrine, the Court held that prescription began to run on tort claims when the pits at issue were closed. Further, because plaintiffs’ tort claims were prescribed, plaintiffs were not entitled to recover punitive damages.

The Court also found that some claims for cleanup based upon breach of a mineral lease do not expire while the lease is in effect, given that some restoration obligations on lessees arise when a lease expires. As result, the Court held that some of the breach of lease claims, those brought by the Marin plaintiffs, were not prescribed because the surface lease and mineral lease were still in effect. On the other hand, the Breaux plaintiffs’ claims were prescribed because the lease on their land expired before suit was filed. The Breaux plaintiffs were also aware of damage more than 10 years before suit was filed while the Marin plaintiffs arguably would not have discovered damage until 1994, less than 10 years before suit was filed.

Regarding the restoration claims, the Court held that, in circumstances where a lease has excess wear and tear due to contamination, the remedy is clean up to regulatory standards absent an express lease provision requiring additional remediation. In addition, the majority reversed the lower courts and found that a surface lease on one of the pieces of property at issue in the case did not require cleanup to original condition because a 1994 amendment imposing such a requirement was a novation of an earlier lease and therefore the cleanup obligation did not apply to the contamination at issue because it predated 1994.

Lastly, the majority denied the plaintiffs' claim for groundwater remediation and upheld the lower courts’ finding that remediation was not required since useable groundwater was not at issue. The Court further noted that it was illogical to award money to a landowner to remediate unusable groundwater, with no oversight by Louisiana’s Department of Natural Resources, when the Louisiana statute enacted to protect groundwater did not require such a cleanup.

For more information, see www.lasc.org/opinions/2010/09c2368.opn.pdf

EPA Announces January 2011 as Likely Date for Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Under PSD Program

By Stephen Wiegand

EPA recently announced its position regarding the timing of the regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program.

A PSD permit is required before a new industrial facility can be built or an existing facility can be modified in a way that significantly increases pollutant emissions. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gases are “pollutants” under the Clean Air Act but left open the specific question of whether greenhouse gases could be regulated under the PSD Program. In December 2008, then-EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson issued a memorandum indicating that the PSD Program applies to pollutants that are subject to either an actual provision in the Clean Air Act or a regulation adopted by the EPA under the Act which requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant. However, pollutants such as carbon dioxide, for which EPA regulations only require monitoring and reporting, are not subject to PSD permitting.

In October 2009, new EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced that EPA would reconsider and accept public comment on the Johnson memorandum. On March 29, 2010, EPA announced its final decision regarding the reconsideration. Specifically, EPA determined that PSD permitting is not triggered for pollutants such as greenhouse gases until a final nationwide rule requires actual control of emissions of the pollutant. Thus, in the case of greenhouse gases, EPA announced that the PSD requirements will likely not be triggered until January 2, 2011, the date upon which EPA’s rule limiting the greenhouse gas emissions for cars and light trucks is expected to take effect.

For more information on the announcement, see the EPA New Source Review.
 

Proposed EPA Rules Would Subject Oil and Gas Sources to Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

By Stepehen Wiegand

In October 2009, EPA promulgated the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule. This rule required reporting of greenhouse gas emissions from a number of large sources including suppliers of fossil fuels or industrial greenhouse gases, manufacturers of vehicles and engines, and certain facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons or more per year of greenhouse gas emissions.

On March 22, 2010, EPA announced proposed rules to amend the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule to cover additional sources including petroleum and natural gas facilities emitting 25,000 metric tons or more of greenhouse gas emissions. Covered facilities would include onshore petroleum and natural gas production, offshore petroleum and natural gas production, onshore natural gas processing, natural gas transmission, underground natural gas storage, liquefied natural gas storage, liquefied natural gas import and export facilities, and natural gas distribution facilities. The proposed rules would require the reporting of fugitive and vented methane and carbon dioxide emissions, including carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide combustion emissions from flares.

In addition to the oil and natural gas sector, EPA is also proposing to collect emissions data from industries that emit fluorinated gases and from facilities that inject and store carbon dioxide underground for the purpose of geological sequestration or enhanced oil and natural gas recovery.

Under the proposed rules, the newly covered sources are required to begin collecting emissions data on January 1, 2011 and are required to submit the first annual reports to EPA on March 31, 2012.

The public comment period on the proposed rules will extend for 60 days after EPA’s publication of the proposed rules in the Federal Register. Additionally, two public hearings are currently scheduled on the proposed rules – April 19, 2010 in Arlington, Va. and April 20, 2010 in Washington, D.C.

For more information on the proposed rules, see:www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/proposedrule.html

 

Office of Conservation Publishes Proposed Amendments to Statewide Order 29-B

In early 2010, the Louisiana Office of Conservation published in the Louisiana Register a Notice of Intent to amend Statewide Order 29-B, the regulation governing the storage, treatment, and disposal of exploration and production waste at oilfield sites. The proposed amendments provide specific procedures for the evaluation and remediation of groundwater conditions and potential sources that may have contributed to those conditions at oil and gas exploration and production sites. Specifically, the amendments provide that agency submissions made pursuant to Statewide Order 29-B must demonstrate compliance with the conditions set forth in the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources Exploration and Production Site Evaluation and Remediation Procedures Manual (SERP Manual). The SERP Manual, which will become effective upon final promulgation of the amendments, will include site evaluation and remediation protocol and procedures established in conformance with the latest revision of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality’s Risk Evaluation/Corrective Action Program (RECAP) document.

The public hearing for the proposed amendments will take place on April 5, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Written comments will be accepted until 4:30 p.m. on April 12, 2010.

To view the proposed amendments, go to:
http://www.doa.louisiana.gov/osr/reg/1002/1002.pdf
 

EPA Issues Final Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding

By Stephen Wiegand

On December 15, 2009, EPA published in the Federal Register its final endangerment findings with respect to greenhouse gases. See 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) [http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/Federal_Register-EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0171-Dec.15-09.pdf]. This rulemaking is a response to Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), in which the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gases were “pollutants” under the Clean Air Act and ordered EPA to determine whether greenhouse gases “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” under Section 202 of the Act.
In its findings published on December 15, EPA concluded that six greenhouse gases taken in combination may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and public welfare. These gases include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. In reaching these conclusions, EPA considered the extent to which elevated concentrations of greenhouse gases may cause changes in air quality, increases in temperature, changes in extreme weather events, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens, and changes in aeroallergens. EPA relied on assessments by the U.S. Global Climate Research Program, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the National Research Council.
While these findings do not in themselves impose any requirements on regulated entities, they are a prerequisite to future regulation of greenhouse gases under existing Clean Air Act authority. Many view the existing Clean Air Act as ill-suited to the regulation of greenhouse gases. This endangerment finding, along with EPA’s proposal to regulate greenhouse gases under existing Clean Air Act authority, see EPA Proposed PSD and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule [http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/env/rules/74/74fr55292.pdf], is being used as a forcing function to accelerate the passage of stand-alone greenhouse gas legislation by Congress.

 

Louisiana Supreme Court Holds that Act 136 of the Mineral Code is Inapplicable to Remediation Suits

By Matt Simone

In Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not required, pursuant to Article 136 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, to provide a defendant with pre-suit written notice and an opportunity to perform prior to a judicial demand for property restoration related to oil and gas production contamination. Article 136 mandates these requirements for claims “arising from drainage of the property leased or from any other claim that the lessee has failed to develop and operate the property leased as a prudent operator….” The defendants argued that Article 136’s requirements should apply to any claim alleging that a lessee failed to act as a prudent operator. The court rejected the defendants’ position noting that the plain language of Article 136 is limited to claims regarding drainage of property or failure to develop and operate leased property. Since this case essentially involved a remediation/restoration claim, the court found that Article 136’s pre-suit requirements were inapplicable.

To read the case, go to http://www.lasc.org/news_releases/2009/2009-064.asp
 

Fifth Circuit Holds that Individual Citizens Have Standing to Sue Energy Companies for Global Warming

By April Rolen-Ogden

In Comer v. Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit left open the possibility that the oil and gas industry may be privately sued for alleged contributions to global warming. In this putative class action lawsuit, Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ operation of energy, fossil fuels, and chemical industries in the United States contributed to global warming. Plaintiffs further claimed that those contributions caused a rise in sea levels and added to the devastation wreaked by Hurricane Katrina, which destroyed Plaintiffs’ property and some public property. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs had standing for their nuisance, trespass and negligence claims, which were premised on the alleged causal link between global warming and Hurricane Katrina’s destruction of Plaintiffs’ property. The Fifth Circuit also held these claims were justiciable and thus ripe for determination by a court. Based on these findings, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, which had dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims, and remanded for further proceedings.

To read further, please go to http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/07/07-60756-CV0.wpd.pdf
 

New Permit Requirements for Hydraulic Fracturing of the Haynesville Shale

By Stephen Weigand

The Shreveport Times reports that federal authorities have added additional permit requirements for companies who pump water from the Red River for hydraulic fracturing of the Haynesville Shale. The requirements were added after the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service raised concerns that the pumping process could be disturbing the habitat of three federally endangered and threatened Red River species. These species include the pallid sturgeon as well as a bird known as the interior least tern and a plant known as earth fruit. According to the Times, one of the new requirements is that a pump not be placed within 600 feet of an active least tern colony. This requirement effectively forces companies to survey the area before submitting a permit application. Additionally, the Times reports that the Fish and Wildlife Service is also requesting the use of smaller pipes and a diffuser to eliminate the possibility of sucking in fish during the pumping process.
 

For the full story, see http://www.shreveporttimes.com/article/20090921/NEWS01/909200332
 

Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms Denial of Class Certification in Alleged Chemical Exposure Case

By Jessica Gladney

In Thomas v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 2008-0541 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/09), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification against the defendants, Exxon Mobil Corporation and Chalmette Refining, L.L.C. The proposed class consisted of approximately 7,000 claimants from Algiers and St. Bernard, and the plaintiffs alleged personal injury and property damages from emissions of petrochemical facilities operated by the defendants over a fourteen-year period. The claims forms submitted did not specify dates that claimants allegedly suffered from any of the alleged damages, and the trial court concluded that the claims among the purported class members varied so greatly that the putative class representatives could not adequately represent the class. The Fourth Circuit recognized that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding in Ford v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A., Inc., 1996-2913 (La. 9/9/97), 703 So. 2d 542 was controlling and affirmed the trial court’s holding denying class certification. The court noted that the wide variances in geographic location, claimed exposure, and types and degree of damages claimed by the putative class members demonstrated that the claims were too individualized and the certification of the class should therefore be denied.

EPA Self-Audit Policy Goes Online; Gives "Clean Start" to New Owners

The Environmental Protection Agency announced several updates to its Audit Policy this month that promise to make the system more convenient for users and more forgiving for new owners of regulated facilities. 

Continue Reading...

DuPont and ConocoPhillips Settle Environmental Clean-Up Claims against U.S. Government for $52M

         

           In 1997, DuPont and ConocoPhillips sued the United States pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), alleging entitlement to reimbursement of costs expended cleaning up hazardous waste from fifteen sites previously owned by the government during World Wars I and II, and the Korean War.  E.I. DuPont, et al v. USA, et al, United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Docket No. 2:97-CV-00487-WJM-MF.  The decade-long dispute finally ended in a compromise wherein the government agreed to pay DuPont $51M and ConocoPhillips $1M for past and future clean-up costs.

 

            The settlement comes one year after the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Atlantic Research Corp. in which the Court established that a potentially responsible party can sue other responsible parties under Section 107 of CERCLA to recover voluntary clean-up costs.  The Third Circuit had previously held that DuPont could not recover under CERCLA.  Following the High Court’s decision in Atlantic Research, however, the Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration.  This settlement agreement was promoted by the Atlantic Research decision. 

 

            Under the terms of the settlement agreement, DuPont agreed to indemnify the United States up to $51M against any claims, past and future, arising from fourteen of the sites, and ConocoPhillips agreed to indemnity up to $1M for the remaining site.  The government, DuPont, and ConocoPhillips have admitted no liability in connection with the settlement. 

LDEQ May Require Louisiana Facilities Exempt From Air Permitting to Maintain Emission Records

By Clare Bienvenu

Pursuant to Act 547, passed by the Louisiana Legislature in the 2008 Regular Session and recently signed into law by the Governor, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) may now require Louisiana facilities exempt from air permitting requirements to maintain records showing that the actual or potential emissions of the facility meet the exemption.  Under existing Louisiana law, a facility is exempt from air permitting requirements if its potential emissions are: (1) less than 5 tpy (tons per year) for each regulated air pollutant; (2) less than 15 tpy for all regulated pollutants combined; and (3) less than the minimum emission rate for each toxic air pollutant listed in LAC 33:III.5112, Table 51.1.  See La. R.S. 30:2054(B)(2)(b)(ix) (as enacted by Act 918 in 2003).  The original exemption did not authorize LDEQ to mandate the maintenance of emissions records for exempt sources.  Act 547 additionally defines “potential emissions” as “the emissions the facility is capable of emitting considering all control measures in place, utilized and properly maintained and historical practices, including hours of operation and number of employees at the facility.”  Act 547 itself does not require exempt facilities to maintain records, but allows LDEQ to promulgate standards or regulations to create such a requirement.  As such, exempt facilities in Louisiana should be on the lookout for the implementing rule from LDEQ. 

Ninth Circuit Vacates EPA Rule Excepting Oil and Gas Construction Discharges from NPDES Permitting

By Claire Bienvenu

On May 23, 2008, the Ninth Circuit vacated EPA’s rule exempting discharges of sediment resulting from oil and gas construction activities from National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit requirements. NRDC v. EPA, No. 06-73217 (9th Cir. 5/23/08).  The Ninth Circuit found EPA’s rule, which was a codification of a recent exemption added to the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act), to be an impermissible interpretation of the Act. Unless overturned, the court’s decision to vacate the regulation imposes an unexpected obligation on the oil and gas industry to obtain NPDES permits for all construction activities disturbing land area greater than or equal to one acre in size. 

Continue Reading...

Third Circuit interprets Act 312

 In Germany v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2007-1145 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08), -- So. 2d --,  the Third Circuit upheld the trial court’s ruling that under Act 312 a single trial of all issues should be held prior to referring a case to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) for the development of a remediation plan. 

Continue Reading...

Employee Lacked Personal Liability for Oilfield Environmental Damage Under Louisiana Law

By Kindall James

The issue of whether an individual employee is personally liable for oilfield environmental damages was recently addressed in Kling Realty Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc, 2007 WL 81665 (W.D. La. 2007).  The plaintiff mineral lessors claimed that their property had been damaged by oilfield operations, and sued not only the operator, but also a production supervisor.  The plaintiffs argued that the supervisor was individually liable because in his supervisory capacity he had the duty to prevent or limit hazardous pollution affecting the property.  Finding that the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the supervisor’s responsibilities entailed more than general administrative responsibilities or that the supervisor knew or should have known of any ongoing activities hazardous to the property, the court held that the plaintiffs could not possibly establish that the supervisor was personally liable for their damages, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against him. 

Continue Reading...

Louisiana Supreme Court Denies Writ on Act 312 Procedure

In Duplantier v. BP Amoco, et al., the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that under Act 312 of 2006 (La. R.S. 30:29), there should be a single trial of both the regulatory remediation covered by the statute and the plaintiffs' separate damages claims (if any).  The Louisiana Supreme Court has now denied a writ application with respect to that opinion.  To view the Fourth Circuit's decision, click here.  Act 312, which became effective June 8, 2006, requires involvement of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in litigation alleging environmental contamination, including submission of any remediation plan to DNR for approval and the deposit of remediation funds into the registry of the court to be spent on remediation, rather than payment of those funds to the plaintiffs.  However, the statute also preserves the plaintiffs' right to pursue any private cause of action - for example, a right under an express lease provision to a higher standard of clean-up.  Under the Duplantier decision, both the statutory remediation and any private claims will be addressed in a single trial before any plan is submitted to DNR.

 

Louisiana Extends Abandonment Period For Litigation Affected by Katrina or Rita

By Joe Giarrusso

In Louisiana, a lawsuit is generally deemed abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution for three years.  This rule is operative without any formal order.  La. Code Civ. P. art 561.  However, Act 361 of 2007 extended the period for abandonment to five years where (1) the action was initiated prior to August 26, 2005, and was not previously declared abandoned under the general three year period, and (2) the party proves that the failure to take a step in the prosecution or defense of the suit was caused by or was a direct result of Hurricanes Katrina or Rita.  The revision became effective July 9, 2007.   Click here to read the Act.

OPA Does Not Preclude State Law Claims for Additional Compensation

By Drew Spaniol

The Eastern District of Louisiana recently held that the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing state law claims for additional liability or compensation.  Isla Corp. v. Sundown Energy, LP, 2007 WL 1240212 (E.D. La. 4/27/07).  The case concerned oil tanks on a drill site owned and operated by Sundown, which were ruptured in Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiffs asserted claims under both OPA and state law.  Seeking to avoid the additional liability of the state law claims, Sundown argued in a motion to dismiss that OPA provided plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy. The court held, however, that while OPA provides the sole federal remedy for oil pollution claims, OPA expressly allows states to provide for "any additional liability or requirements with respect to the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such state."  Because of this provision, the court denied Sundown's motion to dismiss and allowed plaintiff's state law claims to go forward. 

EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Publish Joint Guidance

By Robert E. Holden and Monica Derbes Gibson

 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have released long-awaited guidance addressing jurisdictional determinations under the Clean Water Act (CWA) in the wake of Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).  There is general agreement that Rapanos limited the reach of the CWA, but the Court did not articulate a clear standard for determining whether or not a wetland or body of water is covered by the CWA.  In the guidance, EPA and the Corps explain how they will approach jurisdictional determinations in light of the Rapanos decision.  Click here to view the guidance.  The agencies will take public comments on implementation of the guidance until December 5, 2007.  Comments may be submitted online at  www.regulations.gov, to Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2007-0282, or by email to OW-Docket@epa.gov, with the docket number in the “subject” line. 

Continue Reading...

Fourth Circuit Opines on Act 312 Trial Procedure

In Duplantier v. BP Amoco, et al., the Louisiana Fourth Circuit court of appeal recently issued a ruling on trial court procedure under Act 312 of 2006, La. R.S. 30:29.  Click here to view the opinion.  Act 312, which became effective June 8, 2006, requires involvement of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in litigation alleging environmental contamination, including submission of any remediation plan to DNR for approval, and the deposit of remediation funds into the registry of the court for expenditure on actual remediation rather than payment of those funds to the plaintiffs.  For more on Act 312, click on this blog's "Environmental" archive.

Louisiana DNR Promulgates Regulations Under Act 312

By Dana M. Douglas

On April 20, 2007, the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) issued regulations establishing procedures for agency hearings and the submission and approval of remediation plans under Act 312 of 2006.  Act 312, which enacted La. R.S. 30:29, made sweeping changes to the procedures for litigation involving potential environmental damage to oilfield sites, in order to ensure that remediation awards are actually expended on remediation.  To view the new regulations, which are codified at La. Admin. Code tit. 43, § XIX, Ch. 6, click here.  Most significantly, the regulations establish that Statewide Order 29-B is the basis upon which the agency will evaluate such remediation plans.

Continue Reading...

Act 312 Constitutionality Question Returns to Trial Court

As previously reported, the trial court in M. J . Farms v. ExxonMobil held Act 312 of 2006, governing remediation of oilfield sites, to be unconstitutional.  The Louisiana Supreme Court has now held that the plaintiff did not properly raise the issue of constitutionality at the trial court level, and remanded to allow the plaintiff to specifically plead the unconstitutionality of the act.  M. J. Farms, Ltd. v ExxonMobil Corp.,  No. 07-CA-0450 (La. 4/27/07).  The Court noted that appellate jurisdiction was not invoked because the issue was first raised in a memorandum rather than a pleading.

New EPA Air Toxics Rule Afflects Facilities with TEG Dehydrators

By:  Clare Bienvenu

On January 3, 2007, EPA promulgated a final rule amending 40 C.F.R. part 63, Subpart HH, “NESHAP (National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants) for Source Categories from Oil and Natural Gas Production Facilities” to include the regulation of area sources. See 72 Fed.Reg. 26 (January 3, 2007).  The final rule is posted here.  Subpart HH has historically regulated various emissions points for major sources of air toxics in the oil and natural gas production industry. This amendment adds the regulation of benzene emissions from tetraethylene glycol (TEG) dehydration units at minor sources. The significance of this new rule is that all TEG dehydration units in the oil and gas production industry are now subject to Subpart HH unless they meet the exemption criteria provided in the regulations.  While the amendment adds the regulation of area sources, it does not alter any of the major source standards. Accordingly, any TEG dehydration unit already regulated under Subpart HH’s major source standards must continue to comply with those requirements. 

This article will first discuss control requirements for area source TEG dehydration units, which vary based on whether the unit is located within a high population density area, referred to as an “UA plus offset or UC.” The article will next discuss applicable compliance dates, which vary based on the date the TEG dehydration unit was constructed or modified and whether the unit is located in an “Urban 1 County” and/or a high population density area. Notably, this rule is immediately effective for any source constructed or modified on or after July 8, 2005 and for certain sources constructed or modified on or after February 6, 1998.

Continue Reading...

Murphy Oil Spill Class Settlement Approved

On January 30, 2007, a class action settlement was approved in Turner v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 05-4206 (E.D. La).  The Turner case asserted claims for property damage resulting from a release of oil from tanks located at Murphy's Meraux, Louisiana refinery after Hurricane Katrina.  The $330 million settlement includes a $55 million buyout program, a $120 million compensation program, a credit for $83 million in compensation already paid, and a $71 million remediation program (including credit for $51 million already expended for remediation).  In addition, Murphy agreed to pay plaintiffs' attorneys fees, which the court set at $33.7 million.  The Governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Blanco, testified in favor of the settlment at the Fairness Hearing.  To view the Court's order approving the settlement, click here. Continue Reading...

Louisiana DNR Issues Proposed Regulations Under Act 312

The Louisiana Department of Natural Resources has issued a proposed amendment to Statewide Order 29-B that details the procedures the Department will follow in implementing oilfield clean-up plans referred to the Department under Act 312 of 2006.  The Legislature passed Act 312 in 2006 to address the problem that damages awards in oilfield remediation litigation were not required to be expended on remediation.  Under the Act, the Department is involved in formulating a remediation plan, and the remediation funds are to be deposited in the registry of the court and actually spent on remediation.  The Commissioner of Conservation will conduct a hearing on the proposed regulations on Wednesday February 28, 2007.  Comments may be submitted at the hearing, or may be submitted in writing up to March 7, 2007.  To view the proposed regulations, click here.  Most notably, the draft regulations state that remediation plans must comport with the standards set forth in Order 29-B. 

Louisiana Trial Court Rules Act 312 Unconstitutional

On January 8, 2007, a Louisiana trial judge held Act 312 of 2006 to be unconstitutional.  The Louisiana Attorney General's office immediately filed notice that it will take a suspensive appeal directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court.  M.J. Farms, Ltd v. ExxonMobil Corporation 24,055 (La. 7th J.D.C. Jan. 8, 2007).  Act 312, which became effective June 8, 2006, requires involvement of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in litigation alleging environmental contamination, including submission of any remediation plan to DNR for approval, and the deposit of remediation funds into the registry of the court for expenditure on actual remediation rather than payment of those funds to the plaintiffs.  For further information on Act 312, click here

The plaintiff in M.J. Farms argued that retroactive application of the Act to a suit pending at the time the statute was promulgated unconstitutionally divests the plaintiff of a property right, that is, the cause of action to recover money damages for environmental contamination.  The Louisiana Attorney General opposed that motion, asserting that the statute only concerns remediation of public harm, and does not deprive landowners of claims for redress of private harm.  The January 8, 2007 ruling by Judge Johnson of the Louisiana Seventh Judicial District Court held Act 312 to be unconstitutional and unenforceable.  The opinion is available here.

Continue Reading...

Pipeline Canal Class Action Dismissed

In Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission, et al., Judge Sarah Vance of the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed a suit in which plaintiffs claimed that oil and gas production and pipeline companies’ activities in South Louisiana marshes contributed to the destruction wreaked by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The plaintiffs alleged that dredging of pipeline canals and wellsite locations damaged the marshland, thereby weakening a protective barrier against storm surge and increasing the storm damage suffered by citizens of South Louisiana. Judge Vance held that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Louisiana obligations of neighborhood or Louisiana tort law, finding plaintiffs’ claims to be too “attenuated because they are suing for hurricane damage from storm surge allegedly magnified by coastal erosion caused by the canals, not for a direct loss of acreage due to erosion.” 

 

Continue Reading...